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IN THE FAMILY COURT
AT MANUKAU

I TE KŌTI WHĀNAU
KI MANUKAU

FAM-2024-092-000341
FAM-2024-092-000340
[2024] NZFC 8780

IN THE MATTER OF	THE CARE OF CHILDREN ACT 2004 THE FAMILY VIOLENCE ACT 2018
BETWEEN	[SAIRA GAURI] Applicant
AND	[HANIF LATA] Respondent
AND	[ASMA LATA] Associate Respondent
AND	[PRAVEEN LATA] Associate Respondent

Hearing:	2 July 2024
Appearances:	S Kumar for the Applicant The Respondent [Hanif Lata] in person No appearance by or for [Asma Lata] or [Praveen Lata]
Judgment:	12 July 2024

REASONS JUDGMENT OF FAMILY COURT ASSOCIATE J NIEMAND

Introduction

[1] On 2 July 2024 I presided over a directions conference and judicial conference in respect of these (now consolidated) proceedings. At the conclusion I made orders and directions to bring the proceedings to a close, as follows:

(a) I amended, without opposition, the application to discontinue the proceedings to a consent memorandum/joint application for an interlocutory order pursuant to r 217.

(b) I granted the discontinuance of both applications and recorded that the consequence was that the temporary protection order and interim parenting orders (both being interlocutory orders that remained pending the final determination of the applications) are discharged.

(c) The circumstances of the case were such that I considered that it would be contrary to the interests of justice for me to make an order requiring either party to contribute towards the costs of lawyer for child. Ms Tagelagi's appointment was terminated with the making of the orders that I have set out above, and I directed that neither party be required to contribute towards her costs.

[2] I reserved my reasons for those decisions, which is what this judgment now addresses. For reasons that will probably not be particularly interesting to Ms [Gauri] and Mr [Lata], I need to also record the "jurisdictional" basis for proceeding in the way that I have done. Ms [Gauri] and Mr [Lata] will be more concerned with the outcome, which is already known to them. However, I would ask them to not stop reading at this stage and ask them to pay particular attention to paragraph [28] onwards, from which point what I have recorded in this judgment will be more important to them.

Background

[3] Ms [Gauri] and Mr [Lata] were married on [date deleted] 2022, followed by a traditional Indian wedding on [date deleted] 2023. From this latter date, they started

living together. They have one child from their marriage, being [Jothi] born [date deleted] 2024.

[4] On 10 April 2024 Ms [Gauri] made two applications. Those were:

(a) An urgent application for day-to-day care of [Jothi]; and

(b) An urgent without notice application for a temporary protection order against Mr [Lata] as well as his parents [Asma Lata] and [Praveen Lata].

[5] The affidavit evidence in support of these two applications is identical. Ms [Gauri] sets out the background of her relationship and marriage with Mr [Lata], which largely paints a picture of isolation at the hands of Mr [Lata] and his parents, and their total control over her from 16 February 2023. Ms [Gauri]'s evidence describes her day-to-day position as one of complete servitude to Mr [Lata] and his family, in a setting in which she had no input into the material decision-making about the running of the household or related affairs. She describes her situation as being one where she often found herself alone, helpless, and unable to stand up for herself. Even in this "delegation" of all domestic chores to Ms [Gauri], her evidence is that Mr [Lata] and his family nonetheless put in their two cents. When, for example, they took issue with her care of [Jothi] on the morning of 5 April 2024, they allegedly told Ms [Gauri] that she was a useless mother and that they knew better about what was right for [Jothi].

[6] Ms [Gauri] decided to call the police that day and explained her situation and experiences to them. The police were clearly satisfied based on what Ms [Gauri] had reported to them that family violence had occurred which necessitated a police safety order. As a result, the police issued a police safety order against Mr [Lata] for a 6-day period. Fearing the consequences from the order expiring on 11 April 2024, and with the emotional and financial assistance and support (including meeting legal costs) of her uncle and aunt, Ms [Gauri] started court proceedings.

[7] The duty judge who considered the applications was satisfied that the threshold had been met for immediate orders on a without notice basis. A temporary protection order was made against the respondent and his parents, and an interim parenting order

was made granting Ms [Gauri] the day-to-day care of [Jothi] and reserving contact between [Jothi] and Mr [Lata] on a supervised basis.

[8] What subsequently happened is somewhat at odds with the position expressed by Ms [Gauri] in her documents of needing protection from Mr [Lata]. Almost immediately after the police safety order expired (and notwithstanding the temporary protection order), Ms [Gauri] decided that she wanted to return home with [Jothi] to her husband and his family. She therefore contacted Mr [Lata], and he ended up collecting Ms [Gauri] and [Jothi].

[9] Ms [Gauri] and [Jothi]'s return to Mr [Lata] was strongly opposed by Ms [Gauri]'s uncle and aunt. They threatened Ms [Gauri] that if she chose to return to Mr [Lata] with [Jothi] then they would never talk to her again. Reportedly, they have since cut all ties with Ms [Gauri] as threatened. The additional consequence has also been their withdrawal of financial support for Ms [Gauri] for these proceedings. Since that time therefore, Ms [Gauri] and Mr [Lata] have effectively both been funding the (now unwanted) proceedings between them.

[10] On 15 April 2024 Ms [Gauri] filed an application to discharge both the interim parenting order and temporary protection order. That is unsurprising given the sequence of events that I have outlined above. The affidavit in support of this application records Ms [Gauri]'s reconciliation with Mr [Lata] on 12 April 2024 and which followed her realisation that she wanted to be with her husband and his family. As Ms [Gauri] puts it: "*They are my family.*" Ms [Gauri] further says in her affidavit that she, Mr [Lata] and his family have decided to talk things out if they have any issues in the future and work together to avoid any misunderstandings or ill-will, and that they want [Jothi] to be raised in a proper and loving family environment.

[11] Ms Tagelagi was appointed by the court as [Jothi]'s lawyer. She filed a very helpful and comprehensive report on 1 July 2024. Included therein is her report from her meeting with [Jothi] and the parties. In particular, Ms [Gauri]'s position as she relayed it to Ms Tagelagi was set out in detail at paragraph 13 of the report. At the conference before me, Ms [Gauri] confirmed that this reflected her position and that Ms Tagelagi's report was correct.

[12] Ms Tagelagi reported as follows:

13. **MS [GAURI]** appeared to be very embarrassed by the situation but both she and Mr [Lata] were keen to discuss what had happened. They advised me that:

    (a) within days of [Jothi]''s birth, Ms [Gauri]'s Aunty and Uncle who live in [suburb deleted] had requested Ms [Gauri] and [Jothi] move in to live with them. The couple declined as this was a special time for them to celebrate the birth of their first child together.

    (b) Ms [Gauri] felt she had made a mistake and was too hasty in making a decision to apply for the current Orders.

    (c) Ms [Gauri] explained that she found it difficult communicating her feelings and since applying for the Orders, the family as a whole had discussed how to better support her saying "*we had a big talk, and all is okay now".*

    (d) she called the Police *"in the heat of the moment"*. Ms [Gauri] explained that she was upset and tried calling her mother in Fiji but could not contact her so she called her Aunty and Uncle who mislead her, saying she had to call the Police otherwise the other family could take her baby away. When the Police arrived, a PSO was issued, and they transported Ms [Gauri] and [Jothi] to her Aunty and Uncle's home.

    (e) Ms [Gauri] advised me that her Aunty and Uncle arranged for her to see her lawyer and they told her not to worry, they would pay for everything. She realised what she had done was wrong and that her evidence had been misinterpreted by her lawyer. She said she felt pressured and regretted applying for the Orders and wanted to return home to her husband and his family, so she contacted Mr [Lata] after the 5-day PSO had expired and he collected them.

    (f) Ms [Gauri] also advised me that her Aunty and Uncle threatened that if she chose to return to her husband with the baby they would never talk to her again (which they haven't) and now Mr [Lata] is paying off his wife's outstanding legal fees.

    (g) The parties confirmed that they are very happy now, baby is doing well, Mr [Lata] understood not that his wife was unhappy being at home alone with the baby every day as the rest of the family work long hours. Ms [Gauri] advised that they talk more now and spend more time together as a family and Mr [Lata] confirmed he now understands how important this is and takes time off work to support his wife and daughter more.

    (h) Mr [Lata] confirmed he has not commenced anger management and does not believe this is necessary in the circumstances and is seeking for this direction to be discharged along with the current Orders.

[13] Ms [Gauri] confirmed at the conference before me that she wanted the proceedings to be concluded. Mr [Lata] indicated that he supported that position.

[14] I also had some informal discussions with the parties:

(a) Ms [Gauri] confirmed, additionally, that she told her aunt after signing the affidavit that she did not want to proceed. He aunt told her that the application had already been signed and that there was essentially "no turning back".

(b) When I asked Ms [Gauri] about how things have changed, she indicated that a family meeting occurred with Mr [Lata] and his family and that there was a commitment expressed at that meeting to open communication about matters in the future.

(c) Mr [Lata] essentially confirmed his position to me. He indicated to me that he had not started the course, but that he understood the meaning of family violence. He understood that this can include mental abuse or physical abuse.

Reasons for my decisions

[15] The options available to me at the conference were to either:

(a) Direct the application to proceed to a formal proof hearing, whereby there could be cross-examination of both parties before a Family Court judge and further submissions by the parties and/or counsel; or

(b) Agree to the request essentially made by both parties for the proceedings to be concluded.

[16] I elected to proceed with the latter approach by consolidating the proceedings[1] and treating the applications to discharge the interim orders as a consent application for an interlocutory order to discontinue both applications, which I subsequently granted. My reasons are:

(a) The starting point has to be the objects of the primary legislation under which the applications are brought. As I had consolidated the proceedings, this requires consideration of the purposes and principles of both Acts.

[1] Given that there are clearly a significant commonality in facts and issues in both proceedings.

(b) The purpose of the Care of Children Act is set out in s 3 as aiming to promote children's welfare and best interests and facilitating the development by helping to ensure that appropriate arrangements are in place for their guardianship and care, as well as the recognition of their rights. Section 3(2) sets out a number of things that the Act does to achieve this purpose, which includes the encouragement of agreed arrangements for, and providing for the resolutions of disputes about, the care of children.[2] This also accords with other principles that the Act aims to achieve, to vest the primary responsibility for children's care development and upbringing with their parents and guardians[3] through ongoing consultation and co-operation between children's parents and guardians.[4] Thus, provided that no overriding concern as to the children's safety arises,[5] these principles would favour parents in a court proceeding being empowered to determine the outcome of the proceeding where they can do so by agreement and consensus.

(c) I therefore must firstly consider whether safety issues exist that would preclude the above approach, given that I am exercising statutory powers under the Family Court Rules that affect a proceeding brought under the Care of Children Act.[6] In that regard, I note Ms Tagelagi's report confirming that the parties have no history with the police (other than in respect of the incident giving rise to the application), they do not have any criminal convictions and [Jothi] has not come to the adverse attention of Oranga Tamariki. The affidavit evidence filed should not be considered in isolation when an assessment of the application of relevant principles is undertaken but needs to be looked at in the wider context and in the context of all available information. When I do so, I do not consider that the mandatory principles in s 5(a) of the Care of Children Act are compromised through the approach adopted or that those principles should, in this instance, act to prevent me giving effect to the other Care of Children Act principles that I have outlined above.

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[2] Care of Children Act 2004 s 3(2)(d).
[3] S 5(b).
[4] S 5(c).
[5] This is because children's safety being protected generally, but also specifically from all forms of violence, is a mandatory principle relating to their welfare pursuant to s 5(a).
[6] S 4(2).

(d) I now consider the approach that I should follow under the Family Violence Act. Even a cursory reading of ss 3 and 4 of the Act makes it plain that the Act is entirely "victim focussed". Putting it in a different way, the interests of the victim or putative victim is considered paramount. There are a number of examples, but specifically:

(i) The purpose of the Act is identified as stopping and preventing family violence by, *inter alia*, stopping and preventing perpetrators from inflicting family violence, and keeping victims (including children) safe from family violence;[7]

(ii) The first principle of the Act in s 4 states unequivocally that family violence, in all its forms, is unacceptable.[8] Additionally, it provides that decision makers should consider the views of victims of family violence, and respect those views unless good reason exists to the contrary,[9] that perpetrators of family violence should face effective responses to, and sanctions for family violence,[10] and importantly in this case that access to the court should be as speedy, inexpensive and simple as is consistent with justice.[11]

(e) Particularly relevant here, in my view, is ss 4(m) and 4(o). The continuation of the proceeding reflects an ongoing cost to Ms [Gauri] as the putative victim. The ongoing cost also impacts on [Jothi]. The court must ensure that a situation does not develop where the very processes aiming to provide an effective response to Ms [Gauri] as a victim of family violence, ends up being mechanisms that becomes punitive to her. That would arguably be a form of systemic abuse that would fly in the face of the jurisprudence that underpins the Family Violence Act.

(f) I accept and readily acknowledge that the Act does include a "paternalistic" approach in s 4(m), but on balance, here, I do not

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[7] Family Violence Act 2018 s 3(1)(b)(c).
[8] Ibid s 4(a).
[9] Ibid s 4(m).
[10] Ibid s 4(h).
[11] Ibid s 4(o).

consider that such an approach is warranted in the circumstances to the extent that it should override the clear views and wishes expressed by Ms [Gauri] to conclude the proceedings. Whilst the Family Violence Act is clear that any violence is serious and unacceptable, it is nonetheless possible in this case to consider that the alleged violence is less serious and severe compared with other cases, comprising of alleged psychological abuse arising from Ms [Gauri]'s experiences of domestic life. Without findings, it is not clear to determine how exactly the situations unfolded and thereby shaped Ms [Gauri]'s experiences.

(g) Once I reach this point, the next issue becomes how I can, as a Family Court Associate, conclude the proceedings. I do not have jurisdiction to make substantive orders under the Family Violence Act, for example. I am not empowered under the Family Court Rules to grant an application for discontinuance under Rule 195A. But when I consider that Family Court Rules require me to read and interpret the rules in light of their purpose,[12] then:

(i) I consider that it is quite clear that Ms [Gauri]'s application to discharge the interim court orders is, in reality, an application to end the court proceedings. It is also clear that this became the mutual outcome sought by both her and Mr [Lata]. That then becomes the "real question" to be determined between the parties. I can facilitate and advance the parties' objective therefore by using Rule 78(1)(c) to amend the application to one that is a joint application by the parties to discontinue the proceedings.

(ii) An application to discontinue is clearly an interlocutory application. But parties have procedural options when bringing an interlocutory application – they can either file an interlocutory application in the usual way or they can, under Rule 217, file a consent memorandum instead of an application. If a consent memorandum is filed, then Rule 217(3) provides

[12] As per r 3 of the Family Court Rules, which emphasises the need for Family Court proceedings to be dealt with fairly, inexpensively, simply, and speedily as is consistent with justice, and furthermore without needless formality, and in a way that meets the purpose and spirit of the family law Acts under which the proceedings are brought.

that the Registrar **must** either make and seal the order in terms of the memorandum, or otherwise refer the memorandum to a Judge or Family Court Associate.

(iii) A Family Court Associate can exercise the powers conferred on a Registrar.[13] If, therefore, I receive a joint application (which, in my view, has the same effect as a consent memorandum), I am empowered to make and seal an order on the terms sought, or otherwise refer the matter to a Judge.

(iv) Needless to say, in determining which option to pursue, I must consider the proceedings as a whole. Here, I must consider whether my intended course of action meets the principles of the Family Violence Act and Care of Children Act. In particular, I must be satisfied – as I have already noted – that I do not compromise the mandatory welfare and best interests considerations contained in the Care of Children Act.

(v) It follows that I have concluded that a Family Court Associate does have the jurisdiction to conclude proceedings in the Family Court on this basis. There is nothing in Rule 195A or Rule 217 that precludes the process in Rule 217(3) from applying to interlocutory applications to discontinue proceedings where that is sought jointly, rather than the "usual process" of a single-party interlocutory application. The process is procedural, and does not result in the court making substantive orders pursuant to legislation under which the proceedings are brought.

(h) Finally, I am aware that it is occasionally a practice in the Family Court to consider an application to discharge a temporary protection order and discontinue the substantive proceeding against the grounds set out in s 110 of the Family Violence Act. That is presumably so because of the fact that such applications are typically drafted as a composite application to both discharge the temporary order and then discontinue the substantive proceeding. In my view, that approach is at odds with

[13] Schedule 2 of the Family Court Act 1980, s 4.

the statutory framework, and I have accordingly not proceeded in that manner. My reasons for that are:

(i) Section 107 of the Family Violence Act sets out the duration of protection orders. It draws a distinction between the duration of temporary protection orders and final protection orders. Under that section, a temporary order continues either until it becomes final by operation of law, or if it lapses due to non-service, or if it is discharged pursuant to s 153 or 155. Section 107(2) provides that a final protection order continues in force until it is discharged under s 109. From that, Parliament's intention appears to be that a discharge of a final protection order – and not a temporary one – is the one that must meet the requirements of s 109, which in turn incorporates the requirement for the discharge to comply with the testing criteria set out in s 110. That same requirement is noticeably absent for the criteria against which the discharge or conclusion of temporary protection orders are dealt with.

(ii) In my view, this approach is logical. When a temporary protection order is made, the court does so effectively on the basis of the evidence of the applicant only. Therefore, considering the criteria under s 110(2) in relation to temporary protection orders is somewhat of an artificial process. For example, without a hearing taking place, the court cannot readily determine in a way that is consistent with the overall justice between all parties:

(a) the behaviour that led to the making of the order;

(b) whether the respondent acknowledges their behaviour (when the court has not been able to determine what behaviour occurred with due deference to the respondent's right to be heard);

(c) the risk of future family violence.

Were that different, it would require the court to compel reluctant parties to be brought to court and be subjected to a court hearing within a process that they do not want. Quite apart from the practical difficulties with that approach, it offends against the principles of the Family Violence Act that I have already outlined above.

(i) Finally, a temporary protection order is interlocutory in nature.[14] This is apparent from s 76 of the Act which provides that a protection order made on an application without notice is a temporary order. I consider it clear that a temporary protection order can only exist whilst there is before the court an application for the making of a final order, and that the temporary order is made pending the determination of the substantive application either by operation of law or by hearing. Therefore, it follows that a discontinuance of a substantive application for a protection order results automatically in the discharge of a temporary protection order as a necessary procedural consequence (as opposed to statutory discharge order).

Conclusion on discontinuance application(s)

[17] For these reasons, I made the orders set out at paragraph [1](a) and (b) above.

Cost contribution orders

[18] I then considered the issue of whether circumstances existed pursuant to s 135A(4) meaning that I should adjust the presumptive contribution that each party is to make to Ms Tagelagi's costs as [Jothi]'s court-appointed lawyer. This is an issue that often arises at the end of proceedings in the Family Court, because the court is required to make an order pursuant to s 135A, unless the court declines to do so in accordance with that section.[15] The court may, for example, decline to make an order if satisfied that, in view of the circumstances of the case and including the conduct of

[14] Though not defined in the Family Violence Act, the Family Court Rules define "interlocutory application" as an application for an order or direction relating to a procedure or for some relief ancillary to the orders or declarations sought in the proceedings or intended proceedings. The temporary order made fits that criteria. The substantive application seeks the making of a final protection order.

[15] s 131(4), Care of Children Act 2004.

any party, it would be inappropriate to require a party to pay the usual amount payable. The court may then substitute a different amount for that party to pay.[16]

[19] Likewise, however, children's welfare and best interests in their particular circumstances must be the first and paramount consideration in the administration and application of the Act.[17] Determining cost contributions is a mandatory function arising from the operation of the Act. It is thus undoubtedly a matter arising from the administration and application of the Act which, by virtue of s 4, must be undertaken through the child-welfare paramountcy lens.

[20] Relying on the reasoning in *Payne v Payne*[18], the High Court in *Re Karaka* reasoned that Parliament's decision to amend s 142 of the Act to refer to costs orders being subject to ss 131 and 135 of the Act suggests that professional fees incurred under those sections are "costs" under s 142 of the Act. The court also noted the use of the expression "costs" is "commonly used in legal circles" to encapsulate contribution towards both costs incurred by the other party and costs incurred by the Registrar.[19] That being so, the Court must consider the "*circumstances*" that could arise to warrant the adjustment of the amount payable pursuant to s 135A(4) within that context, and also within the context of recognising the uniqueness of each case before it, the individualised nature of the child/welfare assessment[20] and, accordingly, the individualised nature of the assessment of circumstances. A "tick box" approach cannot suffice.

[21] Some general principles, however, are applicable. Specifically, the High Court in *Pyke v Sherriff*[21] recognised and upheld the earlier approach of a full bench of the High Court in *R v S*[22] where Heath J held:

> "In my view, it is wrong in principle to make an adverse order for costs against a parent who advances a genuine and responsible argument in what he or she regards as the best interest of the child. If costs orders are made in those circumstances, they may operate as a disincentive for such arguments to be put to the court. As the Family Court, in guardianship proceedings, exercises an inquisitorial jurisdiction, it is important that all relevant arguments be put before the court... further, I am of the view that, particularly in a case where

[16] s 135A(4), Care of Children Act 2004.

[17] s 4(1)(a), Care of Children Act 2004.

[18] [1997] 15 FRNZ 706 (HC)

[19] *Re Karaka* [2016] NZHC 183, at [29] & [40].

[20] This is well-established law - see, for example, *Kacem v Bashir* or *Brown v Argyle*.

[21] [2017] NZHC 1990.

[22] [2004] NZFLR 207.

> the Judge does not appear to have made any determinations of credibility as between the parents and where the case might properly be said to be finally balanced, it is wrong, as a matter of principle, for costs automatically to follow the event in such proceedings..."

[22] In light of *Re Karaka*, I consider that this dicta should likewise be applicable to cost contribution orders, and the matters set out above be relevant considerations of "*circumstances*" for the purposes of s 135A(4).

[23] In this case, the proceedings commenced as an application by Ms [Gauri] to obtain assistance to resolve difficulties between the parties in the circumstances that I have already outlined. But those proceedings have now been resolved without a hearing, reflecting the desirability arising from s 5(c) of the Act for parties to resolve matters like these. Thus, neither party required the court to determine an outcome for them, and it was in [Jothi]'s best interests for the court to be able to conclude this proceeding without a hearing which will potentially polarise her parents in their respective positions and place them in an adversarial setting against each other.

[24] Without such a hearing, however, neither party is now able to establish - to the requisite standard – that the position which they have, or may have, advanced during this proceeding as to [Jothi]'s care arrangements is more correct than the position advanced by the other parent. Consequently, by otherwise promoting [Jothi]'s welfare as outlined above, the parties become legally unable to persuade the court to properly consider their liability for lawyer for child costs with reference to the provisions of the Act – specifically s 135A(4) – as they would otherwise be entitled to do.

[25] In these circumstances where the parties have achieved an agreed outcome and where there cannot be any genuine suggestion that either has taken a position that was not ".. *a genuine and responsible argument"*[23] as to the [Jothi]'s welfare, I consider that it would be contrary to both [Jothi]'s interests, and the interests of justice to then financially "penalise" the parties – and therefore also [Jothi], as outlined further below.

[26] Any order made pursuant to s 135A would impact the parties. Funds not available to them due to having to meet the costs of lawyer for child's appointment detracts from finances available to them for [Jothi]'s benefit. This further weighs against the making of orders requiring the parents to make a cost contribution. Although I apply that as a consideration in this case, I hasten to add that this is an

[23] As per *R v S*, cited at n 9 above.

argument that should be considered by the court with caution (as it could arise in every proceeding). But it remains one of a number of relevant considerations.

[27] For these reasons, therefore, I concluded that circumstances of this case warranted an outcome that does not require either party to contribute towards the cost of lawyer for child's appointment.

Final words

[28] I reserve my final words for the parties. There should be no criticism (either inferred from my decision or in general) of Ms [Gauri] for taking legal steps to obtain assistance from the court in the circumstances that she did – irrespective of whether she or Mr [Lata] may now wonder whether her reasons to start proceedings were misconceived or not. The options available to her through access to the court and its processes are fundamentally important. I hope that I have acknowledged that. I have also aimed to appropriately respect what I consider to be Ms [Gauri]'s right to ask the proceedings to come to an end if they will no longer serve their intended purpose.

[29] To Mr [Lata] (and, to a degree, to Ms [Gauri] as well), I simply make it clear that Ms [Gauri] will have every right to return to the court if a situation should develop in the future where she has concerns for her safety, and/or [Jothi]'s safety. Mr [Lata], this judgment now registers, as a matter of record, your acknowledgement that family violence is unacceptable, and that you understand what family violence is. If the court is required to look at matters again because situations deteriorate between you and Ms [Gauri] in the future, then the court may have difficulty accepting a response of ignorance of the law or family violence – that is to say, Mr [Lata], that you were unaware that such behaviour constituted family violence and/or was unacceptable.

[30] I sincerely hope, however, that that will not be necessary and that neither party will have any need for court intervention in the future. I emphasise, however, yet again that the processes will remain available to the parties should the need arise.

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Family Court Associate J Niemand
Kaiwhakawā Tuarua o te Kōti Whānau
Date of authentication | Rā motuhēhēnga: 12/07/2024