Division of relationship property — child support — lump sum payment — equal division — compensation — relationship debt — occupation rent — child care costs — cryptocurrency — Property (Relationships) Act 1976, ss 18, 32, 33 & 34 — Child Support Act 1991, ss 104, 105, 109 & 110 — Matrimonial Property Act 1976, s 2(2) — IAT v SJG [2013] NZHC 2976 — X v X [2010] 1 NZLR 601 — Chong v Speller [2005] NZFLR 400 — Taar v Taar [2014] NZHC 1450 — B v B [1997] NZFLR 687 — Fong v Fong [1993] NZFLR 574 — Hammond v Hardy [2007] NZFLR 910. This hearing was to divide the parties' relationship property following the end of their 12 year relationship in 2017. A large hurdle to settling the dispute was missing Litecoin (a cryptocurrency) that each party accused the other of draining from a digital wallet. As there was no evidence to establish who had control of the Litecoin, the Judge simply ordered that when either party came into possession of the profit, it must be divided equally between the parties. The Judge further declined to make an order for compensation for dissipation of relationship property after separation relating to the loss of hardware required to access the digital wallet. Both parties made applications for compensation under s 18B of the Property (Relationships) Act (the PRA). The applicant sought compensation for occupation rent as the respondent and the parties' child had remained in the family home for 50 weeks after separation. On the other hand, the respondent had carried almost the entire cost of raising and caring for the child alone. The Judge declined to make an order against either party. The applicant also sought an order regarding a property jointly owned by the parties in the United Kingdom. Immovable property outside of New Zealand does not fall under the PRA and is not subject to the orders of the Family Court. The applicant argued that the Judge should make an order in respect of the proceeds of sale (as proceeds are movable). Counsel for the respondent countered this argument by noting that as the sale of the property was not yet unconditional there were no proceeds and only property that exists at the time of hearing falls under the PRA. The Judge confirmed this approach, stating it is well established law that orders can only be made in respect of assets that exist at the time of hearing. The applicant failed on this point. The respondent sought a lump sum payment of child support under s 32 of the PRA so she could afford to buy a house for herself and the child. In exercising the court's discretion whether to make such an order, the court was required to consider factors specified in subs 109(3) & (4) and matters set out in subs 105 (4) & (5) of the Child Support Act. Relevant factors identified included that the applicant only contributed $20 per week in child support, an amount that came nowhere near to half the cost of raising a child, the sum sought would reduce the amount of mortgage the applicant would have to raise, and the applicant would not suffer any hardship should such an an order be made. Although the Judge was satisfied that the grounds for making an order for a lump sum were made out, taking the approach in B v B , the calculation of future child support had to made on the basis of the current formula assessment and would not likely be of benefit to the respondent. The Judge gave the respondent the choice of accepting $11,000 as a lump sum now to cover child support until the child was 18 (some 11 years of coverage), or to continue receiving $20 per week but with the possibility of review of this amount should the applicant's income change in the future. The Judge made no order as to costs, given both parties had succeeded and failed on various claims. Judgment Date: 9 December 2019. * * * Note: names have been changed to comply with legal requirements. * * *