Relationship property agreement — application to set aside agreement — global settlement — bankruptcy — extension of time — Property Relationships Act 1976, ss 1M, 1N, 21A, 21F, 21J, 24 & 40 — Evidence Act 2006, s 130 — Family Court Rules 2002, r 207 — District Court Rules, rr 14.2-14.12 — Lawrance v Van Hammerston [2015] NZFC 1426 — Ritchie v Ritchie (1991) 8 FRNZ 197, [1992] NZFLR 266 (HC) — Wang v Ma [2019] NZHC 1821 — Beuker v Beuker (1977) 8 FRNZ 1 MPC 20 — Saunders v Wilkinson [2013] NZFC 7970 — JNL v DN FC Wanganui FAM-2004-083-000363, 21 August 2006 — LMG v TGP FC Greymouth FAM-2010-018-000040, 14 October 2010 — Clark v Sims (High Court, Auckland, M135/01, Master Faire, 21 August 2002) — Coxhead v Coxhead [1993] 2 NZLR 397 — Wylie v Wylie [2019] NZHC 2638 — West v West [2003] NZFLR 231 (HC) — Wells v Wells [2006] NZFLR 870 (HC) — Harrison v Harrison [2005] NZFLR 252 — Wood v Wood [1998] 3 NZLR 234 — Campbell v Goldie [2019] NZHC 1573. The applicant sought sought to set aside an earlier compromise agreement recording the division of his and his ex-wife's relationship property after separation. As part of the agreement, the applicant was required to make a final stage payment of $142,270.79 to his ex-wife at the end of 2016. However, the ex-wife was declared bankrupt in 2015 and the respondent Official Assignee for her bankruptcy pursued the applicant to recover this sum. A claim for summary judgment found in favour of the respondent Official Assignee. The Judge considered whether the Court should extend the time limit for leave to file the applicant's claim, whether the original compromise agreement complied with s 21F Property (Relationships) Act, and whether the agreement should be set aside. In assessing whether to grant an extension to the statutory time limit, the Court looked at the length of time between the expiry and the bringing of the application, the explanation for this delay, the merits of the overall case, the possible prejudice to the respondent, and whether it would be just to grant leave to bring the application in all of the circumstances. The respondent's explanation that the delay of four and a half years resulted from his inability to obtain satisfactory legal advice was rejected; he had received sufficient legal advice. The Judge held that the respondent only applied to have the property agreement set aside because of his earlier failure in opposition to the summary judgment. In assessing the merits of the case, the Court looked to s 21F, providing that an agreement is void unless it complies with certain requirements, with the party looking to uphold the agreement bearing the responsibility for proving that the requirements of the section were complied with. The Judge was satisfied that the respondent discharged their onus to prove that the requirements under the Act were complied with. The agreement was not hastily put together and both parties received sufficient advice from experienced legal counsel. The Judge was also satisfied that giving effect to the earlier agreement would not cause serious injustice, noting that the outcome of the summary judgment reduced the final payment by $19,646.70. The Court declined to grant leave for the applicant to bring his claim to set aside the property agreement, and the application was dismissed. An order for security for costs was made. Judgment Date: 16 December 2020