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Hayes v Tauranga City Council [2019] NZDC 15172

Published 21 September 2021

Appeal — disqualification as a dog owner — pattern of infringements — Dog Control Act 1996, ss 4, 5, 25, 26 & 27. The appellant sought an appeal of the decision by the Tauranga City Council hearings panel, upholding a notification of disqualification from owning a dog for a period of three years. The appellant who lived adjacent to the Otumoetai Golf Course was the owner of two American Bulldogs, one unneutered female and her daughter. The daughter was subsequently rehomed. Between February 2017 and November 2018 the council had received numerous complaints relating to the dogs' persistent roaming, leading to the dog being impounded eight times and 33 infringement notices being issued. Eight of the infringement notices were waived or withdrawn. In January 2018 the Tauranga City Council issued the Appellant with an early notice of disqualification under s 25 of the Dog Control Act. This notice was subsequently revoked on acceptance by the Council that changes had been made to fencing on the appellant's property and that the number of infringements had been reduced. Further complaints were received and four additional infringement notices were issued, resulting in a second notification of disqualification by the Council in December 2018. The appellant lodged an objection to the qualification under s 26, which was reviewed by the Tauranga City Council hearings panel. The review panel upheld the disqualification. At issue for the Court was whether, taking into account the mandatory considerations under s 26(3), the disqualification was appropriate. The appellant submitted that the complaints were the result of a vendetta and that the dogs posed no danger; the previous complaints and disqualification should not have been taken into account; there had subsequently been no further complaints for a period of eight months following the issue of the first notice; there had only been four subsequent complaints and a further period of eight months complaint-free, from the date of the last complaint to shortly before the second notice was issued. The court noted that in the absence of any evidence of a vendetta, this claim was unproven. Council submissions included evidence addressing the mandatory criteria set out in s 26(3) including the number and nature of the complaints received between February 2017 and November 2018 (the majority of which were for roaming and five complaints of the dogs "rushing" people or other animals); relevant considerations going to the applicant's competence as a dog owner; that the number and nature of the complaints showed that the dogs were aggressive; that the review panel was entitled to take into account any infringement notices within the two-year period referred to in s 25 including offences before the revocation of the first notice; that the applicant had been afforded every opportunity to control the dogs, and had been offered assistance by the Council but she had failed to do so; and that the Council had no other option but to issue the notice in the interests of public safety. In making a decision the Judge noted that both the hearings panel and the Court could take into account any infringements within the two-year period, also taking into account that there was only one infringement for rushing on the evidence, and that there were large "offence free" periods where no infringement notices were issued. It was further noted that mandatory disqualification under s 25 can be avoided if the authority considers that disqualification is not warranted, giving the example where disqualification would be inappropriate for minor infringements. The Judge concluded that given the overall pattern of established breaches the local authority was justified in concluding disqualification was warranted, noting that this would be the case even were the offences prior to the revoked notice taken into account. However the Judge further concluded that in the absence of any complaints for extended periods the three-year disqualification period was too long, and substituted a disqualification period of 18 months. Judgment Date: 8 August 2019.

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